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Problem solving research is in need for re-thinking main 
questions. The purpose of this paper is a stock-taking of some 
of the identified problems, to discuss potential remedies for 
them, and to look for future perspectives. I see three areas for 
discussion: (1) What are the phenomena to be explained? (2) 
What methods should be used? What methodology is 
appropriate to the subject? (3) What is the progress in theory 
since the legendary work from Newell and Simon (1972)? 
What can we expect from new data sources? How can we 
relate data to theoretical assumptions? 
Keywords: problem solving; methodology; research 
questions. 
 
 “How does the solution arise from the problem situation? In what 
ways is the solution of a problem attained?” (Duncker, 1945, p.1) 
Introduction 
In 1982, Ulric Neisser published a famous paper entitled 
"Memory: What are the important questions?" that 
requested a change in research topics for memory research. 
Instead of research on laboratory-induced phenomena, he 
wrote, researchers should look for more real-life orientation 
of their research questions and thereby increased the 
relevance of psychological memory research by addressing 
questions like eyewitness testimony and other phenomena 
of everyday memories. 
In my view that is based on 30 years active research in 
this subfield, problem solving research is in need for a 
similar shift. After the seminal paper from Dietrich Dörner 
(1980) that proposed to move from simple to complex 
problems, a lot of research has been initiated in that area 
(for an overview, see the two editions: Frensch & Funke, 
1995; Sternberg & Frensch, 1991) and delivered new 
insights into phenomena like intellectual emergency 
reaction (Dörner, 1997) or into the connection between 
emotion and complex problems (Spering, Wagener, & 
Funke, 2005). At the same time, a decline of traditional 
problem solving research in the style of Newell and Simon 
(1972) has occurred, if one follows the description given by 
Ohlsson (2012). 
The request for a change in research paradigms is not a 
new one – in the nearby area of decision making, claims 
about a shift of the research focus to more natural situations 
are clearly articulated. Gary Klein and his “Naturalistic 
Decision Making” group (see for a review: Klein, 2008) 
postulated such a shift many years ago; also, Gigerenzer and 
his ABC group (see for a review: Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011) promoted a shift in the field of decision making to 
incorporate “ecological rationality”. Similarly, Huber (2012) 
pointed to the fact that decision behavior in realistic risky 
scenarios is quite different from that in gambles; it requires 
not probability estimation but active risk-management. 
The purpose of this paper is a stock-taking of some of the 
problems identified, to discuss potential remedies for them 
and to look for future perspectives. To discuss the current 
state in the field of problem solving, it needs more space 
than six pages in a conference paper – but at least it is a 
starting point for discussion. 
I see three major areas for discussion: (1) What are the 
phenomena to be explained? (2) What methods, what 
methodology is appropriate to the subject? Is the neglect of 
introspection really adequate to our state of the art? (3) 
What is the progress in theory since the legendary work 
from Newell and Simon (1972)? What can we expect from 
new data sources like detailed computer log-files with 
interaction protocols? How can we relate data to theoretical 
assumptions? 
About Phenomena:  
What are the Interesting Issues? 
If one reads papers on problem solving, the world as it is 
reflected in the articles looks as if there were no changes for 
the last 50 years. Tasks like the Nine-Dot Problem (first 
mentioned in Sam Loyd's Cyclopedia of Puzzles from 1914) 
that require insight problem solving are still famous (e.g., 
MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001). The same is true 
for the Tower of Hanoi (e.g., Anderson, Albert, & Fincham, 
2005), a kind of “drosophila” for problem solving research.  
But the phenomena outside the lab (i.e., the problems we 
have to face in reality) have changed dramatically. Intrans-
parency, dynamics, and polytely, for example, are omnipre-
sent in daily lifes’ problem spaces. I will explain these three 
features shortly. 
 
Attributes of real-world problems Real problems are not 
presented on a silver platter and do not show all necessary 
information to the problem solving person (intransparency). 
On the contrary: information selection has become a new 
problem – on the one side to identify missing information, 
on the other side to find valuable information in a flood of 
potentially misleading or false data.  
It is not only information collection and selection that has 
changed drastically. Typically, real life problems are not 
static situations like a position on a chessboard – on the 
contrary: they change over time while we are still in the 
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process of searching for solutions (dynamics). High-stake 
problems (e.g., catastrophic events) often change over time 
very quickly and require adaptive strategies and flexible 
responses. 
Last but not least: the goal function is not well defined or, 
even worse, contains seemingly contradictory goals (Blech 
& Funke, 2010). Especially in political conflicts, the 
polytelic structure of the situation makes it sometimes 
impossible to find acceptable compromises (polytely). 
 
Definition of problems What is a “problem”? In simple 
situations, problems are “well-defined”. There is a set of 
givens, some operators to change the givens, and a well-
defined state that has to be reached with minimal effort. In 
complex situations, problem definitions vary with the 
different perspectives from the different stakeholders. It 
varies because the different stakeholders follow different 
goals. Consequently, in “wicked problems” (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973) there are no clearly defined goal states; the 
problem is “ill-defined” in terms of an optimal goal state.  
Problem solving research with wicked problems is also 
research about a persons’ preferences and her/his goal 
structures – without goals, there are no problems. Changing 
the aspiration level leads to a change in the difficulty of the 
problem under question – a change that is also possible if 
one alters the level of resolution in the description of the 
problem space (Selten et al., 2012). 
 
Interactions with emotion and motivation Problem 
solving is seen primarily as a cognitive activity – but is that 
a true description of the phenomenon? If someone does not 
reach a goal immediately the situation can become 
frustrating. Problems are defined by producing negative 
emotions. So, why are we not researching the regulation 
processes in the case of complex problems? 
The same is true for motivation: When do we loose 
interest in a problem and give up (or change our aspiration 
level; see the section above)? Why show some problem 
solvers more “grit” than others? The self-regulatory 
activities are not only related to cognition, but also to 
emotion and motivation. Our theories about problem solving 
are mostly theories about cognitive processes that ignore 
interactions with other psychic functions.  
 
Consequences So, from my point of view problem solving 
research has to address at least some of these features in 
more detail and follow the recommendations given by Klein 
(2008) about the need for “naturalistic decision making”. 
How people deal with uncertainty is a still unexplained 
phenomenon (Dörner, 1980; Mackinnon & Wearing, 1980; 
Osman, 2010). Also, there remains as an open question the 
one of processing complexity: Does complex problem 
solving require complex cognition, or is it simply more of 
the same simple basic cognitive processes (see Funke, 
2010)? 
Rethinking Methods and Methodology:  
What is the Best Way for Data Collection? 
The questions of method and methodology depend on 
epistemological assumptions that are prevalent in certain 
scientific communities. They change over time depending 
on the current paradigms. I will not discuss fundamental 
issues but concentrate on the value of introspection and on 
sampling issues (sampling of problems as well as of 
solvers). 
 
Introspection, Single Cases, Simulations Whereas in the 
beginning of modern psychology of thinking, introspection 
was still an acceptable technique, behavioristic traditions 
have eliminated this source of evidence nearly completely. 
In a recent paper, Jäkel and Schreiber (2013) encouraged 
cognitive scientists to revisit this methodological approach. 
In their understanding, introspection (“…the ill-understood 
and problematic metacognitive processes that are central to 
introspective methods and that distinguish them cognitively 
from think-aloud methods”, Jäkel & Schreiber 2013, p. 22) 
offers a chance for a better understanding of cognitive and 
meta-cognitive processes. 
What we need are in-depth descriptions and analyses of 
how people deal with complex dynamic situations in daily 
life, business, politics, science, and technology. Successes 
as well as failures may provide a rich source of data for 
researchers (Dörner, 1997). Kluwe (1995) put emphasis on 
the use of single cases of complex problem solving but up to 
now not much research has been done in that direction (but 
see, e.g., Dörner & Güss, 2011). As has been demonstrated 
impressingly in the case of catastrophes (e.g., Zapf & 
Reason, 1994), such singular events contain a lot of 
information that can be used as proof of concepts and 
theories. Cognitive modeling often starts with the 
reproduction of single case activities. A database with such 
cases would allow for testing and comparing different 
models with broadly accepted and deeply documented 
reference cases. 
Last but not least: the use of computer simulations 
(Brehmer & Dörner, 1993; Gray, 2002) brings complexity 
into the lab and allows for manipulation of time (real-time, 
slow-motion, fast motion) and space (reality, fiction). But 
can we really trust results from simulated scenarios? Isn`t it 
necessary to go into the field, search for high-stake 
situations and see how stakeholders act there? We need 
more research on this issue before a solid answer can be 
given. 
 
Stimulus sampling of problems For assessment purposes, 
a large item universe is needed. That is one of the 
advantages of formal systems (Funke, 2001) like structural 
equation systems or finite state automata. The disadvantage 
of using these formalisms is the restricted range of problems 
that all follow the same model. Subjects are confronted with 
changing semantics but the deep structure of the problems 
does not change: one has to deal with linear combinations or 
with state transitions. After a while, the problem situations 
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become routine and the assessment no longer addresses 
problem solving behavior but routine actions. How long are 
subjects in those assessment situations problem solvers and 
when do they learn from experience? 
  
It is funny that problems that nowadays come under the 
term “complex problem solving”, are less complex (in terms 
of the previously described attributes of complex situations) 
than at the beginning of this new research tradition. The 
emphasis on psychometric qualities has led to a loss of 
variety. Systems thinking requires more than analyzing 
models with two or three linear equations – nonlinearity, 
cyclicity, rebound effects, etc. are inherent features of 
complex problems and should show up at least in some of 
the problems used for research and assessment purposes. 
Minimal complex systems run the danger of becoming 
minimal valid systems. 
To increase the validity of assessments, we do not need 
more of the same, but different types of task requirements. 
The universe of (complex) problems seems to be large 
enough to allow for proper and diverse task selection. If 
stimulus sampling is not done broadly, Fiedler (2011, p. 
166) warns against the consequences of bad practices, 
namely, that "findings may reveal more about the stimuli 
chosen than the persons being tested". 
  
Person sampling of problem solvers Sternberg (1995) 
points in his comparison of European and North American 
research on complex problems to the fact that different types 
of problem solvers are on focus: Americans prefer experts, 
Europeans prefer novices. Also, NDM has a clear 
preference to experts in their natural setting (Klein, 2008).  
From my point of view, we need samples of novices as 
well as those of experts – the novices showing domain-
general strategies influenced by little previous knowledge, 
the experts showing domain-specific procedures with a lot 
of world and domain knowledge in the background. As has 
been demonstrated in the case of creativity research, if one 
orients research to psychometric standards one needs larger 
samples and has therefore to reduce selection criteria (see 
Gruber & Bödeker, 2005, p. 4). Consequently, real experts 
in solving complex problems from which one could learn 
about successful strategies fall out of scope. The identified 
and measured thought processes might not be representative 
for the domain.  
 
Consequences So, from my point of view problem solving 
research has to give up methodological rigorism and to open 
the field once again for controlled introspection and single-
case studies that describe the phenomena in a less restricted 
way. At the same time, more variety in terms of problem 
situations as well as in terms of problem solvers is needed to 
get a broader view of the phenomenon. Psychometric 
requirements should not dictate the selection of tasks; 
instead, these requirements should be fulfilled after the 
search for valid sampling methods has been successful 
made. 
Relating Theories to Data:  
How is Progress to be Expected? 
Since the seminal work from Newell and Simon (1972) that 
introduced the concepts of “problem space”, “heuristic 
search”, and “logic theorist” not much progress in theory 
has occurred. The “theory of spaces” has been differentiated 
by, e.g., Burns and Vollmeyer (2002), Klahr and Dunbar 
(1988), or Simon and Lea (1974). The use of simple 
heuristics has been demonstrated in many experimental 
situations (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Concerning 
logical decision making, the assumptions of a “homo 
economicus” are highly questionable. Decision makers 
outside of laboratory gambles do not search for 
probabilities, but for “risk-defusing operators” (Huber, 
2012). Is the Instance-Based Learning Theory (Gonzalez, 
Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003) an optimal starting point for theory 
formulation? We have to apply theories like this one to our 
data and see if they can explain or even predict some of the 
phenomena that we find in our data sets. 
Might we expect progress in theory if we go into “Big 
Data”? The use of data mining techniques is nowadays an 
interesting approach (e.g., Zoanetti, 2010). From my point 
of view, theory comes first by delivering the constructs we 
are searching for. This leads to the question: how is problem 
solving related to other constructs in the field? I will 
concentrate my review on the relation of problem solving to 
intelligence, wisdom, creativity, and executive functions.  
 
Intelligence For many years, a controversy existed between 
those who believed in complex problem solving processes 
as being a separate competency (e.g., Beckmann & Guthke, 
1995) compared to those who did not believe in this specific 
competency but who reduced CPS performance to basic 
abilities like working memory capacity and intelligence 
combined with knowledge (e.g., Süß, Kersting, & Oberauer, 
1993).  
The relationship between CPS and intelligence was 
indeed for long time an unclear one (for a review, see 
Wenke, Frensch, & Funke, 2005) but recent research, in the 
context of large-scale assessment (Greiff et al., 2013; 
Wüstenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 2012) as well as in other 
contexts (Danner, Hagemann, Schankin, Hager, & Funke, 
2011), supported the view of an identifiable and measurable 
CPS competency beyond IQ. The exact attributes of this 
surplus competency and the actual processes behind this 
competency remain open.  
 
Wisdom The connection to wisdom is also unclear: it 
should be related to problem solving because finding 
acceptable solutions for conflicts is one important attribute 
of wisdom (Baltes & Smith, 2008). Wisdom is also needed 
for choosing appropriate strategies. For example, the famous 
Chinese Thirty-Six Stratagems can be seen as a collection of 
strategic wisdom that can be applied to complex problems. 
Managerial problem solving might profit from these ideas. 
Without research on these issues, we do not know. 
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As long as knowledge-poor problems dominate our 
research labs, we will not detect strong effects of accumu-
lated and crystallized knowledge.  
 
Creativity The more complex a problem becomes, the more 
creativity in finding appropriate solutions is necessary. 
Because problem solving is defined as non-routine behavior, 
it is essentially connected to creativity (Simonton, 2012). 
The introductory quote to this paper from Duncker (1945) 
points exactly to that connection. To be clear: creativity is 
one important aspect of problem solving, but does not cover 
other aspects of the concept that consist also of strategy 
development and use, knowledge acquisition and 
application, etc. 
The assumed strong connection between creativity and 
problem solving has implications for assessment: the more 
complex a presented problem, the more freedom in 
generating solutions by a subject is required. If a subject has 
to choose options for actions from pull-down menus, 
assessment of creativity in the context of generating and 
finding solutions to problems is massively restricted. 
 
Decision making, planning, executive functions In a 
recent review, Diamond (2012) differentiates three higher 
executive functions: reasoning, problem solving, and 
planning. The first two are said to be synonymous with fluid 
intelligence. The strong interest in self-regulation processes 
connects these research areas under a common label (see 
Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). 
Decision making should be seen as a specific cognitive 
activity within a larger activity called problem solving. In 
the course of problem solving, many decisions have to be 
made – but they have to be orchestrated and integrated into 
the course of action regulation. Metacognition is needed to 
monitor the whole process and to redirect attention 
depending on solution progress. 
 
Consequences The connection between problem solving 
and related constructs can be tested by comparing models of 
their relationship with appropriate data. From my point of 
view, process models need other types of data than 
structural models: Because computer-based assessment 
technologies offer the chance to get rich log-files, 
developing and testing such models should be possible. 
Here I see also a chance for cognitive modeling to inform us 
about basic processes and how they contribute to the 
constructs on the next levels of aggregation. 
Final Remarks 
Problem solving is one of the key competencies in the 21st 
century. That explains the interest of PISA and other 
worldwide operating large-scale assessments of the 
competencies of next generations’ workforce. The reason 
for this is simple: more and more business is done non-
routinely and therefore requires problem solving activities 
(see, e.g., Autor, Murnane & Levy, 2003). 
To be clear: problem solving requires more than moving 
towers or connecting dots under some restrictions. Problem 
solving is not only a cognitive process but includes also 
motivation and emotion regulation due to frustrations (Barth 
& Funke, 2010). Problem solving also requires more than 
solving linear equation systems: The concept of minimal 
complexity (Greiff & Funke, 2009) and the resulting 
assessment of dynamic decision making (see Greiff, 
Wüstenberg, & Funke, 2012; Wüstenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 
2012) were useful steps for classroom assessment but it 
needs a more ambitious, informationally comprehensive 
environment to address the richness of problem solving in 
dynamic environments.  
When summarizing the recent history of problem solving 
research under the auspices from what he correctly labeled 
the “Newell-Simon paradigm”, Ohlsson (2012, p. 117) 
wrote:  
“In summary, Newell and Simon’s first concept of 
generality, codified in the General Problem Solver, failed as 
a psychological theory because it is not true: there is no 
single problem solving mechanism, no universal strategy that 
people apply across all domains and of which every task-
specific strategy is a specific instance. Their second concept 
of generality initiated research on the cognitive architecture. 
The latter is a successful scientific concern with many 
accomplishments and a bright future. But it buys generality 
by focusing on a time band at which problem solving 
becomes invisible, like an elephant viewed from one inch 
away.” 
I have no worry about the future of problem solving 
research when I look around me. In politics, on the business 
market, in our environment but also in our personal life 
complexities are ever increasing. So, the need for research is 
there – what seems to be missing is an attractive problem 
solving theory that stimulates further research, a proper set 
of diverse tasks for experimenting with them, and a 
methodology that opens again the window to inner 
processes. 
Coming back to Ulric Neisser’s (1978) famous paper on 
memory research – did it change anything? Research is a 
slow tanker – but once an idea is in the world it starts to 
influence people. Following Neisser’s comments, memory 
research today is much more real-world oriented than 35 
years ago. So, if my considerations could nudge problem 
solving researchers into a more real-life orientation, I would 
be happy. 
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